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Summary
For over a century the U.S. military has focused on expeditionary warfare
overseas. Its participation in domestic operations has been sporadic and generally in
response to natural disasters.  With the heightened concern about large-scale
terrorism, have come efforts to involve DOD more closely with federal, state and
local agencies in their homeland security activities.   DOD resources are unique in
the government, both in their size and capabilities, and can be applied to both deter
and respond to terrorist acts.  While the DOD leadership is ready and willing to play
a supporting role in these efforts, it wishes to maintain overseas military operations
as the Department’s primary focus, and avoid an drain of fiscal, materiel, and
personnel resources to the homeland security mission.
In response to the increased focus on homeland security, on October 1, 2002,
DOD activated a new combatant command, Northern Command or NORTHCOM..
Exactly how DOD and a new DHS will establish and maintain coordination and
cooperation remains to be seen. Legislation creating  the DHS (P.L. 107-296) is silent
on this question, and details on the new NORTHCOM are scarce.
The intelligence collection and analysis capabilities within the Department of
Defense are a substantial portion of the United States’ national intelligence assets.
They include the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
intelligence and security branches of the individual armed services. Consequently,
the means and extent of cooperation/coordination between DOD and the new DHS
will be of great importance to the success of DHS’s efforts to provide comprehensive
intelligence analysis.
The Department of Defense, with its active duty and reserve forces, and the
potential of federalizing National Guard units, has the largest and most diversified
personnel assets in the Federal Government.  As was demonstrated in the months
after  the September 2001 terrorist attacks, they can be used in a variety of security
and emergency response roles. In particular, the Department of Defense remains the
greatest federal repository of resources for responding to a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident.  It is anticipated that civilian authorities
will eventually develop better capabilities to deal with CBRN incidents, however for
the foreseeable future there will be continued reliance upon DOD assets.
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Homeland Security: The Department of
Defense’s Role
Background
For over a century the U.S. military has focused on expeditionary warfare
overseas. Its participation in domestic operations has been sporadic and generally in
response to natural disasters.  With the heightened concern about large-scale
terrorism, have come efforts to involve DOD more closely with federal, state and
local agencies in their homeland security activities.   DOD resources are unique in
the government, both in their size and capabilities, and can be applied to both deter
and respond to terrorist acts.  While the DOD leadership is ready and willing to play
a supporting role in these efforts, it wishes to maintain overseas military operations
as the Department’s primary focus, and avoid an inadvertent drain of fiscal, materiel,
and personnel resources to the homeland security mission.  In addition,  long-
standing reservations about the use of military forces domestically, and the
consequent statutory limitations on their use, remain strong considerations.  Secretary
Rumsfeld stated before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, there are
three types of situations when DOD resources are called upon to assist civilian
authorities: 1) extraordinary circumstances that require traditional military missions,
such as combat air patrols; 2) emergency circumstances of catastrophic nature
resulting from terrorist attack or natural disaster; and 3) provision of security
assistance at National Security Special Events, such as the Olympics. 1
The Department of Defense makes a distinction between “homeland security”
and “homeland defense” in defining its mission responsibilities.  Homeland security
is defined as:
a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States,
reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks. 
Homeland defense is defined as:
the military protection of United States territory, domestic population, and
critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also
includes routine, steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to
prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails.
CRS-2
In the context of homeland security, DOD will operate only in support of a
civilian lead federal agency when needed, while the larger area of homeland defense
it views as its primary mission.  Pursuant to the DOD FY2003 authorizing legislation
(P.L. 107-314, Sec. 902),  DOD has created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense who is charged with leading the department’s activities in
homeland defense and security.  This office will also serve as Secretary of Defense’s
liaison with the staffs of a new Department of Homeland Security, the National
Security Council, and the White House’s Office
In general, DOD’s contributions to homeland security can be divided into two
general areas: deterrence, and response.  Under these categories are a variety of




The intelligence collection and analysis capabilities within the Department of
Defense are a substantial portion of the United States’ national intelligence assets.
They include the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
intelligence and security branches of the individual armed services.  These assets
provide communication intercepts, satellite reconnaissance, and human intelligence
worldwide.  Consequently, the means and extent of cooperation/coordination
between DOD and the new DHS will be of great importance to the success of DHS’s
efforts to provide comprehensive intelligence analysis.
The DHS legislation does not address DOD’s intelligence assets specifically.
but in establishing the DHS Under-Secretary for Information and Infrastructure
Protection, grants the new department 
...access to all reports, assessments, and analytical information relating to threats
or terrorism in the United States, and to all information concerning infrastructure
vulnerabilities....
The DHS legislation does not grant any administrative or tasking authority over
DOD intelligence assets, and both specifically states that no provision of the
legislation shall be construed as affecting the intelligence authorities of the Secretary
of Defense under the National Security Act of 1947.  It does, however, create a DHS
Intelligence Center, and directs the Secretary of Defense to enter into cooperative
agreements with the new DHS to detail to this center “an appropriate number of
individuals” from the National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Reflecting an increasing interest in the organization of DOD’s intelligence
elements, the FY2003 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314) creates an
Undersecretary for Intelligence.  The responsibilities and authorities of this new
CRS-3
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conspiracy. For a detailed discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act, see CRS Report 95-964,
The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian
Law.
4 “Officials: Homeland Defense Mission Will Mean Changes for the Guard”, Inside
Defense, November 19, 2001.
office are left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, this office will serve as
the conduit for information/intelligence sharing with DHS and will oversee personnel
detailing agreements.
One area of concern involving intelligence which a new Secretary of Homeland
Security will have to resolve is how to fulfill its information-sharing responsibilities
to state and local law enforcement and first responders without compromising
classified national security information or sources.  Providing meaningful and
actionable warnings to state and local officials has proven a challenge.  Lack of
specificity and recommended actions have been the primary criticisms.
Personnel Augmentation2
The Department of Defense, with its active duty and reserve forces, and the
option of federalizing National Guard units, has the largest and most diversified
personnel assets in the Federal Government.  As was demonstrated in the months
after  the September 2001 terrorist attacks, they can be used in a variety of security
roles.  The National Guard augmented the border patrol, customs agencies, and
airport security personnel, flew air patrols, and provided site security in Washington,
DC and New York City.  A major concern when armed forces personnel are deployed
in these roles under federal command is their remaining within the provisions of the
Posse Comitatus Act, which generally prohibits their conducting law enforcement
activities such as arrests or search and seizures.3  Other subjects of controversy have
been whether these detailed military personnel should be armed and whether they
have had sufficient training in civilian law enforcement procedures.
Currently, it appears that the National Guard will continue to play the major role
in homeland security personnel augmentation when needed.   Some National Guard
officials have expressed concern about increased homeland security responsibilities
detracting from its current primary mission of supporting active duty forces in
overseas military operations (e.g. peacekeeping in Bosnia).  Today’s U.S. armed
forces organization and war-fighting doctrine rely significantly upon the participation
of National Guard and reserve personnel, and it has been questioned whether these
requirements could still be met if the homeland security mission predominates.4  It
also must be remembered that National Guard and reserve personnel are primarily
part-time “citizen soldiers”, and that significantly increased operational activations
may well have a negative effect on personnel retention.  Reflecting this concern,
some National Guard officials have called for an increase in full-time active duty
personnel.  The National Guard stands at about 57% of its full-time personnel
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requirement, and the Army has developed a plan to bring that level up to 71% before
2011.5
Northern Command6
DOD has also created a new combatant command, Northern Command or
NORTHCOM.  NORTHCOM’s mission is to:
Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at
the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of
responsibility; and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide
military assistance to civil authorities including incidence management
operations.7
NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility comprises the air, land, and sea
approaches (to 500 nautical miles) to the United States, the continental United States
itself, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.   Hawaii and the
U.S. territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of the Pacific
Command. 
With regard to deterrence, the primary contribution of NORTHCOM will be its
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).  Since the September
2001 airliner attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, NORAD, whose
Cold War mission focused on protection from Soviet missile and bomber attacks, has
shifted significant attention to domestic airway security.  It has recently improved its
coordination/communication capability with the Federal Aviation Administration’s
domestic air traffic control system in order to able to respond to a potential repetition
of the September 11, 2001 attacks.  NORTHCOM may also contribute to homeland
security deterrence efforts in its command of any National Guard units that are
federalized for that mission.   NORTHCOM will not have authority over the U.S.
Coast Guard, which has been transferred to the new Department of Homeland
Security.
Response to Terrorist Incidents
Northern Command
Little information regarding the new command has been released.  Though
activated on October 1, 2002, it is not expected to be fully operational until October
CRS-5
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2003.8  Its headquarters is at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO, and
its commander is  Air Force General  Edward Eberhart.  As noted, NORTHCOM will
subsume the existing North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD),
which the United States operates jointly with Canada.  It is not yet clear what, if any,
role the Canadian military will play within NORTHCOM, aside from its continuing
participation in NORAD.
The new Northern Command does not have a large number of active duty
personnel or units permanently assigned to it, but rather has units “earmarked” for
potential assignment as events warrant.  National Guard units, if federalized for
homeland security operations, will come under NORTHCOM command.
Formerly, the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland
Security coordinated the land and maritime defense of the continental United States,
and all military assistance to civilian authorities.  Subordinate to this headquarters is
the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (CST-CS) which provides command and control
for DOD units deployed in response to any incident involving chemical, biological,
nuclear, radiological, or high-yield conventional explosives.  Generally, these units
are deployed only upon the request of state or local officials to the President.  The
JTF-CS, and the units deployed under its command, remain under the direction of the
lead federal civilian agency at the incident site.9  These Joint Forces Command
headquarters units are transferring to the new NORTHCOM.  It is also expected that
NORTHCOM will expand upon the efforts of the JTF-CS to establish and maintain
close coordination with state and local authorities.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incident
Response
The Department of Defense remains the greatest federal repository of resources
for responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) incident.
It is anticipated that civilian authorities will eventually develop better capabilities to
deal with CBRN incidents, however for the foreseeable future there will be continued
reliance upon DOD assets.
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological-Chemical Command.  In 1996,
Congress directed the Department of Defense to organize a joint service Chemical
and Biological Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT) to support civilian authorities (P.L.
104-201, Sec. 1414).  This team was established in 1997 under the U.S. Army
Soldier and Biological-Chemical Command.  CB-RRT’s mission is to deploy and
coordinate DOD’s technical assistance in support of the federal lead agency (FBI or
FEMA) in both crisis and consequence management of an incident involving
chemical or biological agents. The CB-RRT may also deploy for designated National
Security Special Events (e.g. the Olympics, presidential inaugurations, etc.).
CRS-6
10  For further information, see [http://teu.sbccom.army.mil/factsheet].
Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, the CB-RTT  would coordinate the
CB incident response activities of the following DOD assets:
! U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit
! U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
! U.S. Army Medical Command Special Medical Augmentation
Response Teams and Regional Medical Commands 
! U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
! U.S. Navy Environmental Health Center
! U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force
! National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
! U.S. Army 52nd Ordnance Group (explosive ordnance disposal)
  Brief descriptions of the units most likely to be deployed to a chemical or biological
incident are provided below.
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams.
The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-
CST) are full-time active duty personnel whose mission is to assess a suspected
CBRN incident, advise civilian authorities, and expedite the arrival of additional
military personnel.  Each team consists of 22 personnel and is equipped with CBRN
detection, analysis, and protective equipment.  Congress has authorized 55 WMD-
CSTs, ensure that each state and territory would have a team. 
Of the 55 teams authorized, 27 have received certification of the requisite
training and equipment.  The remainder are still being staffed and equipped.  The
certified teams are located in : Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, California, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.
U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit.  Established in 1944, the Technical
Escort Unit is the longest-standing chemical and biological weapons unit in DOD.
Its mission is to conduct rapid deployment to provide chemical and biological advice,
verification, detection, mitigation, decontamination, escort, and remediation of
chemical and biological devices or hazards worldwide.  In accomplishing this
mission, it has provided support to, among others, the  Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the United Nations.  The Technical Escort unit has also
deployed in the United States as part of security operations at national political
conventions, NATO conferences, presidential inaugurations and State of the Union
addresses, and the Olympics. Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, it has
subordinate units stationed at Dugway Proving Ground, UT, Fort Belvoir, VA, and
Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR.10
U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force.
The Marines’ Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) was
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established  in 1996, and is currently headquartered outside Washington, DC.
CBIRF’s primary mission is to provide chemical-biological force protection and
defensive training for the Marine Corps, however since its inception it has placed
significant emphasis upon preparation to assist state and local authorities in the event
of a domestic chemical-biological incident, participating in over 120 “table-top” and
field exercises with first-responders around the country.  The capabilities which
CBIRF can bring to bear include: CBW agent detection and identification,
decontamination, emergency medical treatment and triage, search and rescue, and
casualty evacuation assistance.
U.S. Special Operations Command 
Both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy have dedicated counterterrorist units
whose primary focus is overseas operations. They could be called upon to
advise/assist civilian law enforcement officials, although the FBI’S Hostage Rescue
Team would normally be the first federal counterterrorist responders in domestic
situations. Official open source information on the organization and mission of these
DOD units is not available.  Generally, even official acknowledgment of their
existence is not forthcoming.  From unofficial sources, a few details can be provided.
The Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, also known as
Delta Force, is based at Ft. Bragg, NC and the Naval Special Warfare Development
Group (formerly SEAL Team 6) is based at Dam Neck, VA.  Both units number
several hundred personnel, and undergo very rigorous and constant training in
marksmanship, close combat, urban combat, SCUBA diving, and high-altitude
parachuting, among other skills. Cross-training with other national counterterrorist
units such as the British Special Air Services and the German Grenzschutz Polizei
(GSG-9) is frequent.   Both units have reportedly participated in every significant
U.S. military operation over the last two decades.
